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Introduction
The  sinking  of  the  Canadian  Arctic  Expedition  (CAE)  ship  Karluk near  Wrangel  Island,
Siberia, in January 1914 has long been the subject of controversy.  The ship’s commander,
Robert Bartlett, was initially hailed as a hero for his journey over the ice from Wrangel Island
to the mainland. Bartlett was able to bring help that saved most of the crew, but eight men had
been lost on the way from the wreck site to the island, and three more died before the rescuers
arrived. 
The expedition leader, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, did not share the prevailing favourable
view. Instead, he severely criticized Bartlett in several private letters. After the CAE ended in
1918, Stefansson insinuated in his publications that Bartlett  was to blame for the tragedy,
while  continuing  to  discuss  Bartlett’s  alleged  responsibility  in  private.  Decades  later  the
CAE’s meteorologist, William Laird McKinlay, responded to these insinuations in his book
Karluk: A Great Untold Story of Arctic Exploration (1976). In McKinlay’s view, Stefansson
alone was responsible. Historians have been divided on the subject; Stefansson’s biographer
William R. Hunt was the most negative about Bartlett, while more recently Jennifer Niven has
written scathingly about Stefansson while extolling Bartlett as a great Arctic hero. 
Much of the difficulty in evaluating this  episode stems from the very complicated
circumstances leading up to the  Karluk’s unplanned drift from the north coast of Alaska to
Siberia, and from the almost equally complicated circumstances that prevented Bartlett from
responding publicly to Stefansson’s innuendoes. As Stefansson wrote in 1916, no one knew
the full facts about the Karluk’s voyage except Bartlett and himself.1 Neither man ever gave
an entirely accurate account. 
Bartlett appears to have spoken or written plainly on this subject to only a few people.
During the expedition, he sent an exceptionally frank letter to his former commander Robert
Peary; this letter has not previously been considered by historians. After the expedition was
1 Stefansson  to  George  Fred  Tilton,  21  January  1916,  Stefansson  Collection,  Dartmouth  College  Library
(hereafter cited as SC), MSS 196, box 2, file 40. All quotations from material in the Stefansson Collection are by
kind permission of Dartmouth College Library.
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2over, Stefansson became embroiled in a controversy with the commander of the expedition’s
Southern Party, Dr Rudolph Anderson, and other members of the scientific staff. Bartlett kept
in close touch with Anderson and confided his side of the Karluk story to Anderson and his
wife, Belle.  The Anderson papers accordingly contain much relevant material  that has not
fully  been utilized.  Using the  Peary papers,  the  Anderson papers,  and other  sources,  this
article takes a fresh look at the loss of the Karluk and the subsequent disputes. It concludes
that while Bartlett bore greater responsibility than McKinlay, Niven and his other admirers
admit, he was also the victim of extensive misrepresentations by Stefansson. 
To properly understand the decisions that led to the disaster, it is necessary to piece
together  evidence  from various  sources,  and to  consider  the life  stories  and ambitions  of
Stefansson and Bartlett. They each felt an intense craving for accomplishment and fame, and
they believed in the theory that there was an undiscovered ‘Arctic continent’ north of the
Beaufort Sea.2 Dazzled by the hope of finding this new land, they took excessive risks. It is,
then, not really a question of whether the expedition leader or the ship’s captain was the more
culpable; rather, the key fact is that Stefansson and Bartlett were both allured by the same
false geographical theory and by the prospect of lasting fame that it seemed to hold out to
them. Despite the later intense hostility between the two men, in 1913 they shared the same
goal.
Stefansson before the CAE
Stefansson was the child of Icelandic immigrants and grew up in the Dakota Territory. His
academic  aptitude  offered  him a  way to  escape  the  relative  poverty  of  his  origins.  After
receiving a bachelor’s degree from the University of Iowa, he went on to Harvard University.
However,  as  a  doctoral  student  and  teaching  assistant  in  anthropology  he  was  not  very
favourably viewed by members of the department. His supervisor, Professor Roland B. Dixon,
later recounted that Stefansson was ‘only fairly efficient’ at his work; far worse, he ‘borrowed
money  right  and  left  from [undergraduate]  students  ...  and  spent  money  rather  lavishly.’
Finally, in the spring of 1906 Stefansson was involved in ‘a rather nasty scandal involving
marks’ in  the  course  for  which  he  served  as  teaching  assistant.  The  department  nearly
recommended Stefansson’s open dismissal from the university.3 
At this juncture, another way to resolve the problem presented itself when Frederic
Ward  Putnam of  Harvard’s  Peabody Museum received  a  letter  from explorers  Ernest  de
Koven  Leffingwell  and  Ejnar  Mikkelsen.  Leffingwell  and  Mikkelsen  were  looking  for  a
2 The great  importance of the supposed Arctic  continent to Stefansson’s  plans was first  noted in Trevor H.
Levere,  ‘Vilhjalmur Stefansson, the Continental  Shelf,  and a New Arctic Continent’,  British Journal for the
History of  Science 21, 2 (June 1988),  pp. 233–47. However,  Levere’s  research  did not include the archival
sources that reveal the full extent of the risks Stefansson was prepared to take in his search for the supposed land.
3 Dixon to Edward Sapir, 17 November 1911, Canadian Museum of History, Edward Sapir Correspondence, I-A-
236M, box 622, folder 39. Another Harvard professor, William Curtis Farabee, wrote in 1912 that Stefansson
‘does not enjoy the full confidence of any member of our anthropological faculty.’ Quoted in Richard Diubaldo,
Stefansson and the Canadian Arctic (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1978), p. 51. The Andersons
later learned that Stefansson’s offence was selling exam questions to students. See Belle Anderson to Helen
Crawford, 21 March, 27 May, and 6 December 1924, LAC, RMA/ MBAA, vol. 9, files 17 and 18.
3young anthropologist to join their Anglo-American Polar Expedition. Putnam recommended
Stefansson  for  the  position.4 Dixon  and  Stefansson’s  other  Harvard  critics  were,  Dixon
reported, ‘very glad to get rid of him.’5 
Stefansson set off for Herschel Island, Yukon, that summer. While there, he learned
from trader  Christian Klengenberg about  a group of Inuit  on Victoria  Island who did not
appear to have come into previous contact with whites.6 Stefansson accomplished little during
his first  northern trip,  and he returned south determined to visit Victoria Island on a new
expedition.  Because he left  the  Arctic  before Leffingwell  and Mikkelsen,  he was able  to
publish  before  they  did.  To  Leffingwell’s  enduring  resentment,  Stefansson  earned  a
considerable sum of money with an article in Harper’s Magazine.7 
During  the  Stefansson-Anderson  Expedition  of  1908–12,  Stefansson  did  reach
Victoria Island. He subsequently disclaimed responsibility for sensational press stories about
the likelihood that the island’s inhabitants, the Copper Inuit or Inuinnait (whom he dubbed the
Blond Eskimos) were descended from the lost Norse Greenland colonists. However, it is clear
that Stefansson was not in fact averse to the publicity that these stories gained for him.8 He
returned to the United States eager to mount a new expedition that would enable him to make
a more intensive study of the Inuinnait. However, he soon learned that the search for an Arctic
continent had become the most popular goal of explorers. It was not long before Stefansson
was proclaiming the discovery of the continent as the primary goal of his new venture.
The Arctic Continent
From  the  time  when  white  men  first  visited  Alaska  and  eastern  Siberia,  they  recorded
indigenous traditions about land to the north, along with alleged sightings of such land. In
1849 Henry Kellett of the Royal Navy landed on Herald Island north of Siberia and saw what
would later be known as Wrangel Island. North and east of these two islands and north and
west of the Canadian archipelago were wide stretches of unmapped ocean. In 1903 Robert E.
Peary mused on the possibility of finding ‘an isolated island continent, an arctic Atlantis ... as
completely isolated from the word as if it were on Mars.’9 Less than a year later, Rollin A.
Harris of the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey put forward the theory that such a
continent did indeed exist north of the Beaufort Sea, basing his arguments on data about the
currents  and  tides.10 After  returning  from  his  1905–06  expedition,  Peary  expressed  his
4 David L.  Browman and Stephen Williams,  Anthropology at  Harvard: A Biographical History,  1790–1940
(Cambridge, MA: Peabody Museum Press, 2103), p. 309.
5 Dixon to Sapir.
6 Stefansson to Putnam, 14 August 1906, Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, 07-08-00/1.
7 Stefansson, ‘The Anglo-American Polar Expedition’,  Harper’s Monthly Magazine 116, 693 (February 1908),
pp. 327–42. Leffingwell was particularly outraged because Stefansson used his photographs without permission.
See statement by Rudolph Anderson, undated, ca. December 1921, LAC, RMA/ MBAA, vol. 11, file 7.
8 See  J.  J.  Underwood  to  Rudolph  Anderson,  14  December  1921,  Canadian  Museum  of  Nature  Archives
(hereafter cited as CMN), 1996-077 Series A – R.M. Anderson (hereafter cited as RMA), box 70, file 16.
9 ‘New Atlantis at Pole: Peary Says There May Be Continent Waiting for “Old Glory”’,  New York Times, 25
October 1903, p. 9.
4conviction that there was land between northern Ellesmere Island and the pole.11 When his
narrative of the expedition was published in 1907, it included a claim to have seen ‘the faint
white summits of a distant land’ to the northwest of Ellesmere – an incident that was strangely
absent from both Peary’s diary and the statements he made immediately after his return.12
Peary gave his alleged new discovery a name: Crocker Land. 
Leffingwell  and  Mikkelsen  were  among  the  first  explorers  who  attempted  to  test
Harris’s  theory.  However,  because their  ship was damaged,  they were able  to  make only
limited investigations  north of Alaska.  Sledging over the ice,  they passed the limit  of the
continental  shelf  and  found deep  water,  proving that  if  there  was  unknown land,  it  was
nowhere near  Alaska.13 The great  Norwegian explorer  and oceanographer  Fridtjof Nansen
expertly debunked Harris’s theories in 1907,14 but the prospect of finding Crocker Land held
enough allure for other explorers that Nansen’s objections were cast aside by most. Peary
made no further claims about sighting new land on his 1908–09 expedition,  but his  rival
Frederick Cook alleged both that he had reached the pole a year before Peary and that he had
glimpsed  what  he  called  Bradley  Land  during  his  northern  journey.15 In  1903 Peary  had
written: ‘Think of writing upon that land some name to endure indelibly ... Believe me, there
is room yet in this prosaic world for a new sensation.’16 A new sensation and an indelible
name were indeed powerful incentives. In 1911 two of Peary’s former subordinates, Donald
MacMillan and George Borup, organized an expedition in quest of the continent. The Crocker
Land Expedition, as it was called, was scheduled to depart in the summer of 1912. However,
the  start  had  to  be  postponed  for  a  year  because  of  Borup’s  untimely  death.  The  delay
presented Stefansson with the opportunity to mount a rival attempt in 1913.
Stefansson’s Evolving Plans, November 1912–July 1913
Stefansson returned from his 1908–12 expedition  in  early September  1912;  just  over two
months later, he announced an exceptionally ambitious new venture whose chief goal was to
find the Arctic continent.  The main base, he declared,  would be on the mainland at Cape
Bathurst. A gasoline-powered schooner would ferry supplies north to Banks Island or perhaps
as  far  as  Prince  Patrick  Island;  journeys  would  then  be  made  over  the  ice  to  the  west,
northwest,  and north.17 (These  plans  were  almost  identical  to  those  formerly  outlined  by
10 R.  A.  Harris,  ‘Evidences  of  Land  Near  the North  Pole’,  Report  of  the  Eighth International  Geographic
Congress, Held in the United States, 1904 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1905), pp. 397–406.
This is an expanded version of an article first published in the June 1904 issue of National Geographic. 
11 ‘Peary to Try Again’,  New York Sun, 10 December 1906, p. 6; ‘Commander Peary Lectures on His Latest
Attempt to Reach the North Pole’, Quebec Chronicle, 10 December 1906, p. 8.
12 Robert E. Peary,  Nearest the Pole: A Narrative of the Polar Expedition of the Peary Arctic Club in the S.S.
Roosevelt, 1905-1906 (New York: Doubleday, Page, 1907), pp. 202, 207; Wally Herbert, The Noose of Laurels:
Robert E. Peary and the Race to the North Pole (New York: Atheneum, 1989), pp. 196–7. 
13 Ejnar Mikkelsen, Conquering the Arctic Ice (London: William Heinemann, 1909), p. 17.
14 Fridtjof Nansen, ‘On North Polar Problems’, Geographical Journal 30, 5 (November 1907), pp. 469–87 and
30, 6 (December 1907), pp. 585–601.
15 Frederick A. Cook, My Attainment of the Pole (New York: Polar Publishing, 1911), p. 243.
16 ‘New Atlantis at Pole.’
17 ‘Stefansson to Seek Arctic Continent’, New York Times, 15 November 1912, p. 5. On Stefansson’s negotiations
and relations with his US sponsors in late 1912 and early 1913, see Diubaldo, pp. 58–60.
5Leffingwell and Mikkelsen.)18 Stefansson would thus try to find Crocker Land from the west,
while  MacMillan  intended  to  use  Peary’s  old  route  in  the  eastern  Arctic.  Despite  this
geographical division, Stefansson’s aim of forestalling MacMillan was clear. 
In January 1913 Roald Amundsen, fresh from his triumph at the South Pole, visited
the United States and revealed that in 1914 he intended to attempt a north polar drift.19 The
plan to drift across the polar basin while frozen into the ice had been originated by Nansen
years before. Nansen’s 1893–96 expedition in his specially built polar ship, the  Fram, was
inspired by the tragedy of the American exploring ship  Jeannette. The  Jeannette expedition
was based on the belief that a warm current flowing northward through Bering Strait created a
relatively ice-free pathway to the North Pole.  The ship was indeed caught in a transpolar
current near Wrangel Island, but there was no ice-free pathway. Instead, the  Jeannette was
crushed in heavy pack ice; many of the men did not survive the retreat to the Siberian coast. A
few years later, wreckage from the ship emerged in the North Atlantic.20
Nansen’s  great  innovation  was to  build a  ship  designed to  resist  ice  pressure.  He
deliberately put the Fram into the pack north of Russia, hoping to drift to the pole. However,
the  current  turned  the  Fram towards  the  North  Atlantic  in  a  more  southerly  latitude.21
Nansen’s drift had begun in the Laptev Sea; he and others theorized that a start from Bering
Strait  instead would produce the desired result.  In 1899 casks were set adrift  on Alaska’s
north  coast;  one  was  later  recovered  in  Iceland.22 Many  explorers  therefore  dreamed  of
succeeding in a drift from Bering Strait; Amundsen intended to use the  Fram for such an
attempt.23
By February 1913, Stefansson’s plans had evolved again to include a possible drift. In
an outline presented to the Canadian government, he stated that the ship would sail as far
north as possible. If new land was found, the main base would be established on it; if not, then
his choice was Prince Patrick Island.24 After the prime minister, Robert Borden, had agreed
that Canada would become the expedition’s sole sponsor, Stefansson remarked to a reporter
that if  his ship became caught in the ice on the northern voyage,  ‘nothing could be done
except  to  let  it  drift.’ But  Stefansson did not  have a  ship like  the  Fram.  Instead,  he had
purchased the Karluk, an old whaler. The Karluk, Stefansson freely admitted, was ‘not built to
withstand the pressure of ice on such a passage, and it might be wrecked.’ In that event, he
thought the men could simply travel back to their base over the ice.25 According to what he
18 See Mikkelsen, Conquering, pp. 16-17.
19 ‘Give $45,000 to Aid Stefansson’s Trip’, New York Times, 14 January 1913, p. 5.
20 See  Edward  Ellsberg,  ‘The  Drift  of  the  “Jeannette”  in  the  Arctic  Sea’,  Proceedings  of  the  American
Philosophical Society 82, 5 (June 1940), pp. 889–96.
21 Nansen, Farthest North, 2 vols (New York: Harper, 1897).
22 Nansen, ‘On North Polar Problems’, p. 597.
23 Amundsen’s 1914 plans were made impossible by the outbreak of war,  but in 1918 he set out in another
specially built ship, the Maud. 
24 Stefansson, ‘Plan of a Proposed Arctic Expedition’, enclosed in Stefansson to Robert Borden, 4 February 1913,
in Janice  Cavell,  ed.,  Documents  on Canadian External  Relations:  The Arctic,  1874–1949 (Ottawa:  Global
Affairs Canada, 2016) (hereafter cited as DCER: Arctic), doc. 198.
25 ‘Stefansson Accepts the Offer of Canada’, New York Times, 27 February 1913, p. 7.
6later told Bartlett (see below), not only was Stefansson not particularly worried about getting
caught in the ice, he expected it to happen and hoped in this way to forestall Amundsen as
well as MacMillan. 
To  Canadian  officials,  Stefansson  downplayed  this  possibility.  Instead,  he  assured
them that the ship would return south after carrying the men to their base. But, he admitted
disingenuously, it might accidentally be caught in the ice. The Karluk would then ‘no doubt
be launched upon a polar drift which ... would probably take her in a great curve to the west
or northwest so that she would eventually pass somewhere between the Pole and the mainland
of Asia and finally emerge into the North Atlantic between Norway and Greenland.’26 Such a
development would open up the possibility of three exceptionally newsworthy achievements:
finding the Arctic continent, reaching the North Pole by a relatively short sledge journey from
the ship, and passing from Pacific to Atlantic over the top of the world. Of all the explorers
who dreamed about the second and third of these achievements in the early twentieth century,
only Stefansson ever contemplated doing so in a ship that was even less strongly built than the
Jeannette.
Stefansson’s  agent  for  the  purchase  of  the  Karluk was  whaling  captain  Theodore
Pedersen, who believed that Stefansson wanted a vessel to carry men and supplies. Pedersen
was initially supposed to be the  Karluk’s skipper, but Stefansson may have doubted that a
conservative whaler would be willing to take the risks he had in mind. In March and April
1913  Stefansson  was  in  Europe  to  buy  equipment,  hire  scientists,  and  attend  the  tenth
International  Geographical  Congress  in  Rome.  There  he  met  Peary,  who  strongly
recommended  Bartlett  on  the  grounds  that  Bartlett  would  always  obey  orders  without
question.27 Stefansson returned to New York in late April and immediately cabled an offer to
Bartlett.28 Pedersen, meanwhile, had become suspicious because Stefansson had not yet made
a formal agreement with him. Rightly anticipating that Stefansson ‘might ditch’ him when it
was too late to find other employment for the summer of 1913, Pedersen agreed to command
a whaling ship instead.29 On 14 May Bartlett accepted Stefansson’s offer.30
Bartlett before the CAE
Like  Stefansson,  Bartlett  grew  up  in  a  remote  area  and  in  relative  poverty.  But  unlike
Stefansson,  he  had  no  opportunity  to  forge  a  career  through  education.  Instead,  his
opportunity came from Peary,  who frequently hired Newfoundlanders to man his ships. In
1898, at the age of twenty-two, Bartlett joined the crew of Peary’s ship Windward. 
Over the years, Peary came to rely on Bartlett more and more. Bartlett served as ship’s
captain on Peary’s 1905–06 expedition, during which Peary unsuccessfully attempted to reach
26 Stefansson to J.D. Hazen, 1 June 1913, enclosed in Hazen to Robert Borden, 11 June 1913, LAC, MG26 H,
Robert Borden Papers, vol. 234, file 2117.
27 Stefansson to Desbarats, 19 May 1913, LAC, RG 42, vol. 468, file 84-2-5 sub 11.
28 Stefansson telegram to Bartlett, ca. 29 April 1913, LAC, RMA/MBAA, vol. 1, file 12.
29 Pedersen telegram to Stefansson, 5 May 1913, LAC, RMA/MBAA, vol. 1, file 13.
30 Stefansson telegram to Bartlett, 14 May 1913, LAC, RG 42, vol. 475, file 84-2-29.
7the North Pole from a base on northern Ellesmere Island. From this time until the end of his
life,  Bartlett  repeatedly  demonstrated  what  a  friend  would  later  describe  as  an  ‘almost
religious’ devotion to his commander.31 
Bartlett’s devotion was not entirely disinterested. In 1905 Peary broached the idea that
once he had reached the North Pole, his next project would be an American expedition to the
South  Pole.  Bartlett  was  convinced  that  while  Peary  would  organize  and  support  the
expedition, he would not personally lead it. Instead, Bartlett would be the leader in the field.
‘It was my big chance’, Bartlett recalled in his autobiography. ‘For the first time in my life I
felt  I  was going to  do something  big  and run the  show myself.’32 As captain  of  Peary’s
specially built new exploring ship, the Roosevelt, Bartlett battled the ice of Nares Strait (the
passage  between Greenland and Ellesmere  Island),  thus  allowing Peary to  make  his  base
much  closer  to  the  pole  than  would otherwise  have  been possible.  Unlike  the  Fram,  the
Roosevelt was designed to break through ice, not to drift in it. Going against what Peary later
called ‘all the so-called canons of Arctic navigation in this region’, Bartlett repeatedly drove
the ship into even the thickest pack ice.33 
After  the 1905–06 expedition  was over,  Bartlett  filed a  declaration  of  intention  to
apply for United States citizenship. No doubt his purpose was to forestall questions about
whether a foreigner should lead the South Pole expedition. The Antarctic venture was now
expected to begin after Peary’s 1908–09 northern expedition, on which Bartlett again served
as ship’s captain. He received his certificate of naturalization in April 1911.34 But by that time,
Bartlett’s dream of polar leadership had been shattered. 
On  31  March  1909  Peary,  Bartlett,  and  seven  others  were  approximately  133
geographical (153 statute) miles from the North Pole. Bartlett had expected to be in the final
group going forward, but instead Peary sent him back in command of the last  supporting
party. ‘If we get there’, Peary assured him, ‘it will be the South Pole next and you as leader.’35
Bartlett accepted the decision with apparent stoicism36 and returned to the expedition’s base
on Ellesmere Island. Only three days later, Peary also reached the base. Bartlett immediately
said, ‘I congratulate you, sir, on the discovery of the Pole.’ Peary responded, ‘How did you
guess it?’37 
31 George Palmer Putnam, Mariner of the North: The Life of Captain Bob Bartlett (New York: Duell, Sloan and
Pearce, 1947), p. 65.
32 Robert A. Bartlett, The Log of Bob Bartlett: The True Story of Forty Years of Seafaring and Exploration  (New
York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1928), p. 239.
33 Peary, Nearest the Pole, p. 39. 
34 Naturalization records, New York Eastern District, roll 135, vol. 20, Ancestry.com.
35 Bartlett, Log, 196. According to Bartlett’s diary, Peary definitely offered Bartlett the South Pole command on
30 March 1909. Deirdre C. Stam, ‘Interpreting Captain Bob Bartlett’s AGS Notebook Chronicling Significant
Parts of Peary’s 1908–09 Expedition’, Geographical Review, Advance Access, 8. 
36 In  newspaper interviews published immediately after the expedition’s return, Bartlett reportedly expressed
bitter disappointment, but in later accounts he denied such feelings. See Harold Horwood,  Bartlett: The Great
Canadian Explorer (Garden City, NY and Toronto: Doubleday and Doubleday Canada, 1977), pp. 87–9. It is of
course possible that the journalists involved exaggerated Bartlett’s comments.
37 Bartlett, Log, 197. Bartlett’s congratulations are in italics in the original.
8Many historians and others have wondered how Bartlett could possibly have believed
Peary’s story, given the speed at which Peary would have had to travel to reach the pole and
return so quickly.38 But perhaps Bartlett,  eager to move on to the south polar attempt, had
deliberately offered his congratulations as a way to push Peary into making a claim, whether
he had actually reached his goal or not. If so, the strategy did not work. For the next few
years, Peary’s energies were consumed by battling Cook’s rival claim. As Bartlett recounted,
Peary never made the lecture tour that they had expected to pay for their next venture. Instead,
‘the financial and moral aid that would have backed up my Antarctic expedition went into
stemming the tide of prejudice against Peary.’39 
Bartlett  then turned to the idea of a polar drift.  It seems highly likely that he also
hoped to reach Peary’s supposed new land. In 1911 Bartlett tried to get support from wealthy
Americans, but he was warned by one of them, Paul Rainey, that the ‘polar game is all off’
because of Cook’s fraud.40 In 1912 came the news that Amundsen had reached the South Pole.
‘Good God it might have been otherwise’, Bartlett reflected gloomily. Unable to find a job in
New York, he reluctantly went back to Newfoundland and captained a sealing ship in the
spring of 1913.41
This was the situation when Stefansson’s offer arrived.  According to what Bartlett
later told the Andersons, when the two men met Stefansson made it clear that he wanted ‘to
buck the ice and if the ship got caught to make the drift.’ He assured Bartlett that the Karluk
was almost as good a ship as the Roosevelt.42 Stefansson did not appear worried about being
caught in the ice; on the contrary,  Bartlett  understood that the plan was ‘to drift  and beat
Amundsen to it.’43 Bartlett must have studied the details of the Jeannette story while making
his own plans for a drift. Nevertheless, he apparently felt no initial qualms about facing the
ice in a ship not specially built for polar exploration. He assured Stefansson that he would
‘faithfully  carry  out  orders  even  in  cases  where  he  personally  does  not  believe  in  their
wisdom.’44 To the  press,  Stefansson reported  that  Bartlett  ‘is  a  man  who is  not  afraid of
hurting his ship, and not eager to save it at the expense of the expedition. He goes cheerfully
into such a hazard.’45
38 For example, see Denis Rawlins,  Peary at the North Pole: Fact or Fiction? (Washington and New York:
Robert B. Luce, 1973), pp. 157–60; Herbert,  Noose of Laurels, p. 256; Robert M. Bryce,  Cook & Peary: The
Polar Controversy, Resolved (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1997), pp. 519–20, 920; Stam, ‘Interpreting
Bartlett’s AGS Notebook’, pp. 11–12.
39 Bartlett, Log, 240.
40 Bartlett, Log, 241-253; quotations on 248 and 249.
41 Bartlett to Peary, 4 February 1913, National Archives at College Park (hereafter cited as NACP), Robert Edwin
Peary Papers (hereafter cited as REP), box 49, folder Bartlett 1913.
42 Belle Anderson, undated memo, ca. February 1924, Library and Archives Canada (hereafter cited as LAC),
Rudolph Martin Anderson and Mae Belle Allstrand Anderson Papers (hereafter cited as RMA/MBAA), vol. 9,
file 17.
43 Bartlett to Rudolph Anderson, 6 February 1922, LAC, RMA/ MBAA, vol. 3, file 4. 
44 Stefansson to Desbarats, 19 May 1913.
45 ‘Stefansson Gets Peary’s Captain’, New York Times, 21 May 1913, 1; see also ‘To Map Out Last Land’, New
York Times, 27 May 1913, p. 3.
9Bartlett and the Karluk: from Victoria, BC to Harrison Bay, Alaska, August–September
1913
Bartlett’s cheerfulness came to an abrupt end when he first saw the Karluk, which was being
refitted in the naval yard at Esquimalt, near Victoria, British Columbia. Extensive repairs had
been made, and dockyard officials considered the ship was good enough ‘for ordinary work’
in the Arctic.46 Knowing what Stefansson’s actual plans were, Bartlett was hardly reassured.
On 26 May a telegram to Ottawa warned that Bartlett ‘considers ship absolutely unsuitable to
remain winter in the ice. Karluk could take expedition and leave them, ship returning South
for winter.’47 Stefansson was still in Ottawa, and he evidently told G. J. Desbarats, the deputy
minister of the naval service (the official in charge of expedition matters) that the Karluk had
wintered in the Arctic before – which was true – and that it would likely return south in the
autumn of 1913 – which was not true. Desbarats’ reply to Bartlett was: ‘Understand Karluk
wintered  several  times  in  Arctic  intention  is  that  if  feasible  ship  should  return  south  for
winter.’48 There was, of course, a considerable difference between wintering in a sheltered
harbour and wintering in the pack ice, but Desbarats does not appear to have considered this
factor.
Desbarats’ formal orders to Stefansson, issued on 29 May, said nothing about a drift.
Instead, they specified that after establishing the base on Prince Patrick Island, the  Karluk
should be sent back south if possible. However, the orders contained a further passage about
the ship, the wording of which was no doubt inspired by Stefansson.49 Desbarats wrote that
Stefansson should ‘bear in mind the necessity of always providing for the safe return of the
party. The safety of the ship itself is not so important.’50 In a press interview the next day,
Stefansson returned to the theme that the Karluk might accidentally be frozen in, but claimed
inaccurately, ‘When a ship is crushed it is forced up upon the ice, and will not sink. We would
not sink.’ He added insouciantly, ‘Of course we may dare too much, in which case, well – we
won’t talk about that.’51 When these statements brought no rebuke from Desbarats, Stefansson
went farther, declaring in another interview that 
So fully has the Government entered into the true aims of exploration that they have
specifically provided in a letter of instructions that the attainment of the purpose of the
expedition is more important than the bringing back safe of the ship on which it sails.
This means that, while every reasonable precaution will be taken to safeguard the lives
of the party, it is realized, both by the backers of the expedition and the members of it,
that even the lives of the party are secondary in the accomplishment of the work.52
46 P.C.W. Howe to Desbarats, 22 April 1913, LAC, RG 42, vol. 464, file 84-2-3.
47 Telegram, 26 May 1913, LAC, RG 42, vol. 464, file 84-2-3.
48 Desbarats telegram to Bartlett, 28 May 1913, LAC, RG 42, vol. 464, file 84-2-3.
49 Rudolph Anderson objected to several provisions that Stefansson managed to have inserted into the orders
after  Anderson  had  left  Ottawa  for  Victoria.  See  Anderson,  ‘The  Canadian  Arctic  Expedition,  1913–1918:
Preliminary History’, LAC, RMA/ MBAA, vol. 10, file 4.
50 Desbarats to Stefansson, 27 May 1913, in DCER: Arctic, 315.
51 ‘Stefansson Talks of Arctic Plans’, Globe (Toronto), 30 May 1913, p. 1.
52 ‘Stefansson Hopes to Achieve Success’, Globe (Toronto), 18 June 1913, p. 1. 
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Either Desbarats never saw this interview or, believing that it was too late to rein Stefansson
in, he decided to ignore it.
Bartlett, meanwhile, had resigned himself to the Karluk’s failings. Another member of
the  expedition,  Dr  Alister  Forbes  Mackay  (a  veteran  of  Ernest  Shackleton’s  Antarctic
expedition) told a reporter that Bartlett had said the Karluk was ‘not fit for the trip, and more
suited to exhibition in a museum.’ The reporter concluded that Bartlett was going forward
‘only to make the best of the position in which he finds himself.’53 After Stefansson arrived in
Victoria on 7 June, however, Bartlett told the press that the Karluk was ‘a good ice ship ... She
cannot stand ramming ice at full speed, but will go into ice as far as she can break her way.’54
The naval dockyard carried out further work, and a few weeks later Bartlett announced that
the  Karluk had  ‘been  made  ready for  all  she  may  be  called  upon to  endure.’55 His  real
feelings, however, were revealed in a letter to Peary. He raged that the ship was ‘rotten as a
pear’ and gave a detailed list of its defects. His report to Ottawa, he recounted, had merely
given the government the impression that he had ‘cold feet’, so there was ‘no use to kick.’ The
ship would ‘never come back’, but Bartlett was determined to ‘do all I can and I shall never
say come back no by God ... It’s the New Land or bust. I will be skipper then, to hell with
Ottawa now. I would love to Land on Crocker Land[.] Hope to God she stays afloat long
enough to get near it.’56 
The Karluk left Victoria for Nome, Alaska on 17 June. In Nome Stefansson began to
worry that he might not have enough supplies for a drift, and he badgered Rudolph Anderson
(who was to lead a scientific  party to the Coronation Gulf region in two other ships, the
Alaska and the Mary Sachs) into giving up most of his pemmican and other condensed food.
As Anderson later disdainfully wrote, Stefansson ‘whin[ed] that I would feel sorry if I didn’t
let him have all the condensed food and he should have to drift for five years.’ Anderson ‘told
him right then’ that if the Karluk was caught, he would not need five years’ supplies.57 James
Murray, the oceanographer, who unlike most of the scientists was to go with the expedition’s
northern party in the Karluk, became intensely worried when Stefansson ‘strongly intimated’
that the ship would deliberately be put into the ice and Bartlett confirmed that if ordered to do
so he would obey.58 Other members  of the northern party joined Murray in asking for ‘a
strong base on shore.’ Stefansson then attempted to oust Murray by asking another scientist,
Frits Johansen, to take his place on the Karluk; Johansen prudently declined.59
53 ‘Dislikes Stefansson Ship’, New York Times, 4 June 1913, p. 2.
54 ‘Stefansson Party on Hand for Start’, New York Times, 9 June 1913, p. 3.
55 ‘Stefansson Ship Ready for Arctic’, New York Times, 15 June 1913, p. 4.
56 Bartlett to Peary, 16 July 1913, NACP, REP, box 49, file Bartlett 1913.
57 Anderson to Bartlett, 19 November 1921, LAC, RMA/ MBAA, vol. 3, file 3. See also Stefansson to Desbarats,
23 June 1913, LAC, RG 42, vol. 476, file 84-2-29.
58 Kenneth Chipman diary, 11 July 1913, LAC, MG30 B66, Kenneth Gordon Chipman Papers (hereafter cited as
KGC), vol. 1.
59 Chipman to W.H. Boyd,  18 July 1913, LAC, KGC, vol.  1, file May-August  1913; see also McKinlay to
Rudolph Anderson, 30 March 1922, and enclosed copy of a letter from McKinlay to a friend, 12 July 1913,
LAC, RMA/ MBAA, vol. 3, file 5.
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From Nome the expedition proceeded to Teller. The Karluk and Mary Sachs left Teller
together on 27 July; the Alaska’s departure was delayed by the need for a few final repairs.
The immediate goal of all three ships was Herschel Island. The CAE had been so rapidly
organized that the supplies and scientific equipment were haphazardly stowed on one ship or
another without any regard for their ultimate destination.60 Until the ships rendezvoused at
Herschel  and  these  matters  were  sorted  out,  the  Karluk could  not  proceed  to  the  north.
Normally, a ship heading from Alaska to the whaling grounds would stick close to shore and
work its way between the mainland and the islands that fringed the coast. To go offshore was
to risk the ice and the powerful current that swept away to the west and north. But the CAE
ships  were very heavily laden and might  go aground if  they kept  close to  shore;  for  the
Karluk,  which  was  the  largest  of  the  three,  this  danger  was  particularly  acute.61 From
Bartlett’s point of view, the worst that could happen if he ventured away from the coast was
merely that the  Karluk would begin its drift earlier than planned. The former owner of the
Mary Sachs,  Peter  Bernard,  had  been retained  as  skipper.  Bartlett  and Bernard  discussed
questions of navigation; unaware of the reason for Bartlett’s willingness to take risks, Bernard
considered him arrogant and foolhardy. When the time came, Bernard disregarded Bartlett’s
instructions to follow the  Karluk closely after leaving Teller. Pursuing his slower and more
cautious way, Bernard soon fell well behind.62 
Pack ice was sighted from the Karluk on 1 August, about 75 miles (120 km) southwest
of Point Barrow. The next evening Bartlett began ‘some hard bucking of the ice’;63 the ship’s
engineer, John Munro, wrote to a friend that the violent collisions ‘nearly scared the life out of
me at first.’ Soon the ship was surrounded and immobilized by the pack. At Cape Smythe
Stefansson went ashore and purchased two umiaks (large, light skin boats, which could be
carried over the ice and used by a retreating party if they met open water). He also hired John
Hadley,  an Englishman with long Arctic experience, and two Inupiat hunters, Kuraluk and
Kataktovik.
They finally  passed Point  Barrow and continued along the northern coast  in  open
water less than ten miles from shore. By this time, Bartlett had become disillusioned with
Stefansson. When Peary wanted Bartlett to take risks, he had given clear instructions to that
effect. Stefansson, in contrast, declined to give definite orders, leaving Bartlett to make the
final  decisions.  Stefansson often  spoke  vaguely  about  caution,  but  never  forbade  a  more
daring course. In Bartlett’s view, this behaviour proved that Stefansson lacked true manliness.
‘Served a great man Peary and supposed this Stefansson was the same doing all I could to get
along’, Bartlett later confided to Anderson. ‘I knew 24 hrs. after leaving Teller that Stefansson
60 McKinlay, Karluk, pp. 14, 19.
61 Bartlett to Anderson, 6 February 1922, LAC, RMA/ MBAA, vol. 3, file 4.
62 Will  E.  Hudson,  ‘Canadian Expedition in  the Arctic  Regions’,  Globe (Toronto),  31 January 1914, p.  15.
Hudson, a Seattle photographer and journalist, was on board a whaling ship that became frozen in near the
Alaska-Yukon  border.  Returning  to  Point  Barrow  overland,  he  encountered  Bernard  at  Collinson  Point  in
October 1913.
63 McKinlay diary, 1 and 2 August 1913, LAC, RMA/ MBAA, vol. 10, file 27; Bartlett,  Log, 258; Munro to
Maude Owens, 6 August  1913, printed in ‘Arctic  Explorer’s Early Adventures’,  Victoria Times Colonist,  22
November 1913, p. 3.
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was no man. But I just kept hoping that I could get to Herschel.’64 Bartlett must have known
that Stefansson intended to shirk responsibility for any accident to the ship, but he held to his
determination that it was ‘the New Land or bust.’ 
Unfortunately, 1913 was one of the worst years for ice ever recorded in the western
Arctic. None of the whaling ships reached Herschel Island that year. At Cross Island, near the
mouth of the Colville River (less than halfway between Point Barrow and Herschel), the ice
near shore became heavier; moreover,  on 10 August the ship, as Bartlett  had feared, went
aground.65 According  to  Stefansson’s  later  accounts,  he  then  advised  Bartlett  that  in  his
opinion they should continue along the coast, sounding carefully, but gave no order to that
effect. Stefansson went to sleep, and on awakening found that Bartlett had headed out to sea.
He did not insist on a return to the coast, and soon the ice had closed in once again.66 The ship
drifted a little eastward, then back to the west. On 10 September it returned to the vicinity of
Cross Island, ‘not far to seaward from where we had gone temporarily aground about a month
before.’67 The Karluk stopped in the outer part of Harrison Bay and was stationary for several
days, until it seemed possible that they would remain in this spot for the entire winter. 
Stefansson was intensely frustrated,  knowing that  even if  the ship broke free they
would  not  reach  Herschel  Island  that  year.  He  decided  to  go  ashore,  ostensibly  to  hunt
caribou, even though the Inupiat were providing plenty of fresh seal meat and Stefansson
knew from his experiences on his previous expedition that there were few caribou on that part
of the coast.68 Several  of the ship’s company would later  recall  that  Stefansson had been
reading about the  Jeannette expedition just before he left, and they speculated that fear had
driven him away.69 However, it is far more likely that Stefansson was irritated by the prospect
of making no progress in any direction, and that he wanted to know what had happened to the
other expedition ships.
Before he departed, taking a small party and 12 days supplies, Stefansson gave Bartlett
written instructions: if the ship began to drift again, as soon as it stopped Bartlett should erect
beacons to guide the hunting party. These instructions said nothing about the possibility that
the ship would start drifting and not stop.70 But according to what Stefansson reportedly later
told Rudolph Anderson, he gave clear verbal orders that Bartlett should ‘push on as long as
64 Bartlett to Anderson, 6 February 1922. Peary himself wrote that when the Roosevelt started up Nares Strait in
1905 he told Bartlett ‘to give her full speed and I would be responsible.’ Peary, Nearest the Pole, p. 33.
65 Stefansson, Friendly Arctic, p. 43; Robert A. Bartlett and Ralph T. Hale, The Last Voyage of the Karluk, 3rd
edn (Boston: Hale, Cushman and Flint, 1928), p. 22.
66 Stefansson to Desbarats, 4 January 1914, SC, MSS 98, box 4, file 2; Chipman to Boyd, 6 January 1914, LAC,
KGC, vol. 1, file January–July 1914; Stefansson to Belle Anderson, 19 January 1914, LAC, RMA/MBAA, vol.
7, file 13; Stefansson to Peary, 19 January 1914, SC, MSS 196, box 2, file 36. According to an oral account by
Diamond Jenness, Stefansson was not asleep at all while Bartlett was taking the ship out into the ice. Jenness
knew this because he could hear Stefansson pacing back and forth in his cabin. Stuart E. Jenness, Stefansson, Dr.
Anderson and the Canadian Arctic Expedition, 1913–1918: A Story of Exploration, Science and Sovereignty
(Gatineau, QC: Canadian Museum of Civilization, 2011), p. 37, n.8.
67 Stefansson, The Friendly Arctic (New York: Macmillan, 1921), p. 53.
68 Stefansson to Peary, 10 February 1911, NACP, REP, box 46, folder S 1911.
69 Bjarne Mamen diary, 7 October 1913, LAC, RG 42, vol. 466, file 84-2-5 sub 1.
70 Stefansson to Bartlett, 20 September 1913, in Bartlett, Last Voyage, pp. 36–8.
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the Karluk would float.’71 Bartlett himself never mentioned such orders, but his subsequent
behaviour strongly suggests that Anderson’s account is correct.
Stefansson on Shore: September 1913–January 1914
According to anthropologist Diamond Jenness, who was with Stefansson’s party, Stefansson
made only a perfunctory attempt to hunt, devoting about half a day to this effort.72 On 22
September a strong wind came up and sent the Karluk westward. Stefansson’s group headed
back to  Point  Barrow by dog sledge,  arriving  on 12 October.  There  was mail  service  at
Barrow (now Utqiagvik),  and there Stefansson dispatched his first accounts to the outside
world. 
His reports to Desbarats in Ottawa and to the press contained no criticism whatever of
Bartlett.  Of the crucial decision to leave the coast at Cross Island on 12 August, he wrote
simply: ‘we commenced working our way out into the pack again.’ He claimed that because
winds from various quarters initially had no effect on their  position in Harrison Bay,  ‘we
thought  the  ship  was  there  to  stay  for  the  winter.’ As  for  the  Karluk’s  probable  fate,
Stefansson described the ship as strong and sound, and as proof of this assertion he cited the
fact that it had received ‘not a scratch’ from Bartlett’s attempts to force a way through heavy
ice. There was not the slightest suggestion that these attempts had been unwise. However, ‘if a
ship is fairly caught she is bound to go, no matter what her strength. ... It is therefore a matter
of good or evil fortune whether she survives.’ But, Stefansson insisted, even if the ship sank,
there was no ‘particular danger’ to the men on board. He himself, meanwhile, was determined
to get to the northern Canadian islands by other means.73 
Stefansson’s disregard for the Karluk was reinforced by the news that the Alaska and
Mary Sachs, although they too had been unable to reach Herschel, had travelled well to the
east and were both safe at Collinson Point near the Alaska-Yukon border. In a second report to
Desbarats, Stefansson repeated his statement that even the strongest ship could be crushed,
and he requested additional supplies to outfit the Alaska and Mary Sachs for northern work in
case the Karluk was ‘lost or held fast in the ice another year.’ It was clear that Stefansson was
no longer much interested in either the  Karluk or its ultimate fate: he wrote that if the ship
was sighted and he was able to visit it he would do so, but it was unlikely he would stay if
there was no possibility of doing ‘useful work.’ Rather, ‘it would seem to me unwise that
anyone should remain aboard beyond the crew.’ His own duty, as he saw it, was to try to reach
Prince Patrick Island.74 
71 Rudolph Anderson to Belle Anderson, 28 June 1914, LAC, RMA/MBAA, vol. 7, file 11.
72 Rudolph Anderson to Charles S. Elton, 13 December 1928, CMN, RMA, box 68, file 38.
73 Stefansson to Desbarats, 18 October 1913, LAC, RG 42, vol. 476, file 84-2-29. This report was received in
Ottawa on 11 February 1914. A very similar report was printed in the Globe on 21 February and in the New York
Times on 22 February.
74 Stefansson to Desbarats, 24 October 1913, LAC, RG 42, vol. 476, file 84-2-29.
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Stefansson then set out for Collinson Point; he arrived there on 15 December and had
the opportunity to speak to Bernard. Moreover, three whaling ships (Belvedere,  Polar Bear,
and  Elvira)  had  been  frozen  in  not  far  east  of  Collinson  Point;  one  of  the  captains  had
previously glimpsed the Karluk in the pack. ‘The whalers ... shake their heads in discussing
Capt. Bartlett’s views on the ice question, as [they] always keep on the shoreward side of the
pack ice, while Bartlett went offshore into the ice’, Anderson had reported in October. When
Stefansson  arrived  with  the  news  that  the  Karluk had  disappeared  entirely,  it  is  easy  to
imagine the condemnation Bartlett received. 
At the same time, however, the whalers viewed Stefansson’s departure from his ship
with cynicism. According to Anderson, ‘Mr. S’s reputation in the North would have been
much better if he had stayed on the Karluk a little longer. People wonder why it should have
been considered necessary to hurry ashore over thin ice as early as Sept. 20th, to hunt caribou
with  his  papers,  private  secretary,  and  cinematographer.’75 Stefansson  knew  that  several
whalers had made their way from the stranded ships back to the Alaskan settlements and from
there to the south, and that opinions similar to those recorded by Anderson might appear in the
press – as in fact they quickly did. Following the arrival of Pedersen (whose ship, the Elvira,
had been crushed by the ice) and Louis Lane (the captain of the Polar Bear), in Seattle, the
New York Sun reported that ‘Just why Stefansson went ashore ... seems to be a mystery to the
men of the Arctic. Stefansson told those aboard the vessel that he came ashore to hunt, but he
75 Rudolph Anderson to Belle Anderson, 16 May 1914, LAC, RMA/MBAA, vol. 7, file 11. The secretary was
Burt McConnell and the cinematographer was George H. (later Sir Hubert) Wilkins. In fairness to Stefansson, it
should be noted that he left many papers, including his diary, on the ship.
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had been along that coast both on foot and in a small boat and he knew there was no hunting.
He was accompanied by the men who had been his best friends.’76 Moreover, this article and
others like it pointed out that many whaling ships had been swept away to the northwest but
only one, the Navard, had ever returned to shore.
When whalers were caught in the drift, they abandoned their ships and struggled back
over the ice; in many cases, some of the men were lost in the attempt. A published letter from
Captain Stephen Cottle of the Belvedere recounted his hope that ‘the [Karluk’s] crew has been
able to make a place of safety to the west of us, there being so much heavy ice in shore as to
make it feasible all right.’77 Anderson informed his wife that the whalers and the members of
the Royal North West Mounted Police were ‘practically unanimous’ in the belief that although
the ship was doomed, the men might get ashore safely.78 But Stefansson knew that because of
his verbal instructions, Bartlett would never give the order to abandon the ship until it actually
went down. The likelihood, then, was that there would be a tragedy and that Stefansson’s own
timely departure from the ship would seem like desertion in the face of danger.
Stefansson’s comments about Bartlett soon took a highly critical turn, likely as a way
to exert a countervailing influence on opinion in the south. In several letters written in January
1914, he admitted his own failure to give definite orders about keeping close to shore, but
claimed that he had been intimidated by Bartlett’s arrogance. There was no hint that Bartlett
was merely doing what  Stefansson had hired him to do;  instead,  Stefansson claimed that
Bartlett took such pride in his successful battles with the ice in the  Roosevelt that, against
Stefansson’s own inclination, he had insisted on attempting to repeat his triumph.79 Stefansson
informed Desbarats that ‘I never saw anyone who had such a case of Big Head in matters
connected with arctic work.’ He provided several probably spurious or exaggerated examples
of Bartlett’s alleged rejection of local knowledge and indeed of any advice whatever from
anyone. On 12 August, Stefansson claimed, he would have ordered Bartlett to turn back if he
had not happened to hear one of the sailors say ‘that it was a fortunate thing we had a skipper
who knew more about ice than the commander.’ Stefansson admitted only to having ‘lacked
the assertiveness, or moral courage, or whatever one would call it, to carry my opinion against
76 ‘Capt. Bartlett Lost in Arctic’,  New York Sun, 19 December 1913, p. 1; see also ‘Draper Back from Arctic’,
New York Times, 19 December 1913, p. 1.
77 ‘“Last of the Karluk”, Arctic Whaler Writes’, New York Sun, 29 December 1913, p. 2. Arctic expert Adolphus
W.  Greely  expressed  a  similar  opinion.  See  ‘Peary  is  Hopeful  of  Stefansson  Ship’,  New  York  Times,  10
December 1913, p. 4. 
78 Rudolph Anderson to Belle Anderson, 28 June 1914.
79 Chipman to Boyd, 6 January 1914, LAC, KGC, vol. 1, file January–July 1914. Chipman added: ‘Stefansson
says that he has had the feeling that Mr. Desbarats in Ottawa may have said to Bartlett, that he had confidence in
him, and through this V.S. conveys an impression of interference on the part of the Naval Service, and a portion
of the moral responsibility having been taken out of his hands.’ Chipman had previously written to the same
correspondent that ‘In a long talk with me Stefansson is quite ready to assume ... blame but it is very easy to see
that in a public discussion of such a thing there will be loopholes by which he will be freed.’ Chipman to Boyd,
15 December 1913, LAC, KGC, vol. 1, file September–December 1913.
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that of the Captain and ship’s company.’80 He thus managed to minimize his responsibility,
although at the cost of portraying himself as a weak leader.81
Bartlett and the Karluk: from Harrison Bay to Wrangel Island, September 1913–March
1914
From 22 September until 3 October the Karluk drifted westward parallel to the Alaskan coast
at  a  rate  of  45  to  60 miles  (72 to  96  km)  a  day.82 Land was  frequently  in  sight;  on 28
September the ship was so close to shore that the crew worried about going aground.83 Yet
Bartlett made no effort to get anyone to safety. On 4 October, as the ship was being swept
inexorably  past  Point  Barrow  toward  the  open  sea,  the  young  Norwegian  assistant
topographer, Bjarne Mamen, reflected cheerfully that they might ‘meet Amundsen up here
next year’; the next day Mamen was calculating how long it would take them to reach the
pole.84 Mamen, who hoped to lead his own expedition one day, clearly shared Bartlett’s ‘New
Land or bust’ philosophy. He ridiculed his comrades when they expressed their fears about
meeting the same fate as the Jeannette. Mamen recorded that that Mackay, Murray, McKinlay,
anthropologist  Henri  Beuchat,  and  geologist  George  Malloch  were  ‘thinking  seriously  of
taking themselves ashore’ but that Bartlett ‘dismissed’ their concerns.85 
Although  Mamen  listed  McKinlay  among  those  who  thought  about  leaving,
McKinlay’s  own accounts  suggest  otherwise.  His  diary  implies,  and  his  narrative  clearly
states, that McKinlay was satisfied by Bartlett’s assurance that they might yet get free of the
ice, and that if they did not, the best course was to winter in the pack. The diary and the
narrative both recount that following this  statement,  Bartlett  refused to discuss the matter
further.86 McKinlay  believed  it  was  his  duty  to  be  loyal  to  Bartlett;  Mamen’s  hope of  a
triumphant outcome slowly faded, but he was convinced that for honour’s sake they must
stick to their ship until the end. Mackay, Murray, and Beuchat remained intensely dissatisfied,
but there was little they could do.87 After the Karluk sank on 11 January, Mamen recorded that
Mackay ‘gave both McKinlay and me hell [because] we had spoiled all his chances and allied
ourselves with Captain Bartlett.’88
Bartlett’s behaviour can be explained by nothing except orders from Stefansson not to
abandon the ship while it was still afloat. Certainly his own ambitions must have played some
80 Stefansson to Desbarats, 4 January 1914. See also Stefansson to Brock, 5 January 1914, SC, MSS 98, box 4,
file 3; Stefansson to Belle Anderson, 19 January 1914; and Stefansson to Peary, 19 January 1914.
81 Stefansson left Collinson Point saying he was going to visit the  Polar Bear and would be back in a week;
instead, he was gone for three months. Stefansson travelled to Fort McPherson and mailed his letters and reports
from there. See Chipman to Boyd, 27 April 1914, LAC, KGC, vol. 1, file January–July 1914.
82 McKinlay diary, 24 September 1913; Bartlett, Last Voyage, pp. 42, 48, 49.
83 Mamen diary, 28 September and 3 October 1913, LAC, RG 42, vol. 466, file 84-2-5 sub 1.
84 Mamen diary, 4 and 5 October 1913.
85 Mamen diary, 7 and 8 October 1913.
86 McKinlay diary, 8-10 October 1913; McKinlay, Karluk, pp. 37–8. 
87 McKinlay diary, 22-24 October 1913; Mamen diary, 5 November and 29 December 1913, 4 and 5 January
1914.
88 Mamen diary, 14 January 1914.
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part; indeed, he later admitted that after the Karluk had survived a few months in the pack, he
began to hope that their adventure would end successfully with ‘books and lectures and a lot
of other money-making products.’89 One of the southern party scientists, Kenneth Chipman,
observed in December 1913 that ‘if the Karluk should achieve anything the public credit is
bound to go to Bartlett and I believe that knowing this he is as happy as may be.’90 However,
it never occurred to Chipman that Bartlett would prevent anyone who wished to leave from
doing so.91 Considering the great danger, if Bartlett had not been constrained by orders he
would surely have taken his men into his confidence and given them option of trying to get
ashore before the ship drifted away from the Alaskan coast. 
Instead, the resentment of Bartlett’s secretive, authoritarian attitude felt by Mackay,
Murray, and Beuchat had deadly consequences. After the ship sank, Bartlett announced that
he would lead the party to nearby Wrangel Island, then to the mainland of Siberia. (After the
first  sledging  attempts,  Bartlett  decided  that  because  most  of  the  men  had  no  Arctic
experience, it would be best for him to make the journey to Siberia with the hunter Kataktovik
as  his  only  companion.)  For  reasons  that  are  not  adequately  explained  in  the  survivors’
accounts, Mackay, Murray, Beuchat, and seaman Stanley Morris decided to strike out on their
own, even though Murray and Beuchat were among the least physically fit members of the
CAE.92 The plan was certain to prove fatal – as Bartlett later brutally put it, they ‘were dead
when they left the camp’93 – but the captain did little to dissuade them. The party’s exact fate
remains unknown. Four other men were lost on the way to Wrangel Island; ten years later
their bodies were found on nearby Herald Island. To reach Wrangel, the remaining men had to
cross pressure ridges as high as 100 feet. The effort left them exhausted and suffering from
various minor injuries.94 Only essential stores were taken; the umiaks were left behind, likely
because they would have been damaged on the way.95 On the island Mamen, Malloch, and
crew member George Breddy died during Bartlett’s absence. 
Stefansson versus Bartlett, 1915–18
Stefansson had  arranged  with  a  clipping  bureau  to  send  him press  commentaries  on  the
expedition whenever possible.96 When he received such a package in August 1915, there was
much to give him pause. For example, an editorial in a Victoria newspaper noted that although
Bartlett had been ‘reticent’ about the Karluk’s defects to reporters, ‘he was not so reserved in
89 Bartlett, Log, p. 264.
90 Chipman to Boyd, 15 December 1913, LAC, KGC, vol. 1, file September–December 1913.
91 See Chipman to Boyd, 6 January 1914. In this letter, Chipman gave his opinions on whether various expedition
members would choose to stay or go.
92 Bartlett later stated that Mackay had been ‘crazy from the effects of drugs.’ Grace Malloch to Belle Anderson,
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discussing them with his friends and associates.’ The author praised Bartlett’s heroism and
suggested  there  should  be  an  official  inquiry  into  the  fitness  of  the  ship.97 Even  more
worrisome was an interview with Pedersen. Pedersen had picked Bartlett up at Emma Harbor
(now Komsomolskaya Bay), Siberia, and taken him to Alaska. The two obviously discussed
the  Karluk’s voyage,  and Pedersen later commented that what Stefansson had required of
Bartlett was unreasonable. ‘What do you suppose I ‘required’ of Capt. Bartlett? And who told
you  what  I  “required”  –  Bartlett  himself?’ Stefansson demanded  in  a  letter  to  Pedersen,
written from Banks Island in January 1916. ‘The substance of my instructions to Bartlett was:
Keep the ship safe ... Was that unreasonable – he thought so, for he told me it would be a cold
day when MacMillan got to Crocker Land ahead of him.’98 Stefansson did not acknowledge
that he himself had been equally set on finding the new land before MacMillan. 
In December 1915 and January 1916 Stefansson penned complaints about Bartlett that
far exceeded his comments in January 1914. His alleged reason for doing so was that he had
realized  the  extent  of  Bartlett’s  misdeeds  only  after  encountering  John  Hadley,  who had
rejoined the expedition in the summer of 1915.99 In a long confidential report to Desbarats,
Stefansson accused Bartlett of having lied about the precautions he took to ensure the safety
of his men. Bartlett, he wrote, could have used the umiaks but did not. Even more seriously,
Stefansson alleged that ‘his leaving the crew on Wrangell Island ... was a “grand stand play”.
It gave him a chance to pose as their savior.’ He insisted that Bartlett could easily and safely
have taken everyone with him, but chose not to because then his feat of crossing the ice to
Siberia ‘would not have looked so marvelous to the uninitiated.’100 
Considering the inexperience of almost all the men on the Karluk and the difficulties
they encountered in getting from the spot where the ship went down to Wrangel Island, this
criticism was absurd. Whether it originated with Hadley or Stefansson is difficult to say. The
CAE’s photographer, George Wilkins, later told Anderson that Hadley appeared to have a
grudge against Bartlett.101 This observation was confirmed in letters written decades later by
the  Karluk’s  second  engineer,  Robert  Williamson.  According  to  Williamson,  Hadley  was
initially on exceptionally good terms with Bartlett,  but became resentful when the captain
refused to take him on the trip to Siberia. Williamson also alleged that after rescue had arrived
Hadley (who was an experienced hunter) attempted to convince Bartlett that he alone was
mainly responsible for ensuring the party’s survival; Williamson himself gave the main credit
to Kuraluk.102 It  seems likely that  Stefansson made it  clear  he wanted information to use
97 ‘The Stefansson Expedition’, Victoria Daily Times, 5 September 1914.
98 Stefansson to Pedersen, 12 January 1916, SC, MSS 98, box 4, file 13.
99 Hadley was first mate of the Polar Bear, which Stefansson purchased from Lane in 1915.
100 Stefansson to Desbarats, 12 January 1916, SC, MSS 98, box 4, file 12.
101 Anderson to Bartlett, 3 February 1922, LAC, RMA/ MBAA, vol. 3, file 4. See also Stuart E. Jenness,  The
Making of an Explorer: George Hubert Wilkins and the Canadian Arctic Expedition, 1913–1916 (Montreal and
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), p. 318. According to Wilkins’s diary, Hadley alleged that in
private, McKinlay was highly critical of Bartlett. This unlikely claim seems to establish that Hadley’s accounts
in 1915 and 1916 were not accurate.
102 Williamson to Stefansson, 30 April and 17 May 1959, LAC, MG30 B44, Robert John Williamson Papers, vol.
1, file 2. Williamson’s account of Hadley’s claim to heroism is borne out by a letter Hadley wrote in October
1914, in which he asked for a government job as a reward for having kept the party alive. Hadley to Desbarats,
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against Bartlett and that Hadley, angry because Bartlett had not shared the limelight with him,
and also possibly lured by the material rewards offered by Stefansson to some of his men at
this point,103 willingly obliged. 
Bartlett,  once back in the United States, published a book (The Last Voyage of the
Karluk, 1916), in which he avoided criticism of Stefansson and described the ship’s drift as
the accidental result of unfortunate circumstances. The book did, however, repeatedly make
comparisons between the Roosevelt and the Karluk, emphasizing the latter’s deficiencies for
exploration  work.104 Bartlett  then  began campaigning  for  a  new polar  drift  expedition.  In
December 1917 Stefansson’s grievances against Bartlett were augmented when he received
clippings about Bartlett’s plan.105 ‘I assumed that the etiquette of the past would hold and no
expedition would enter our part of the Arctic so long as I intended to continue the work’, he
complained.106 Nothing came of Bartlett’s efforts, but Stefansson nevertheless returned south
in the autumn of 1918 in no friendly frame of mind.
Stefansson versus Bartlett after the CAE
Even  before  Stefansson  returned  to  British  Columbia  in  mid-September  1918,  Anderson
warned Bartlett  that  Hadley ‘had been filling Stefansson up with stories,  and that  S.  was
encouraging  Hadley  to  start  something.’107 Hadley  in  fact  did  nothing,  but  Stefansson
criticized both Bartlett and Anderson in various press statements. Anderson, infuriated, wrote
to Isaiah Bowman at the Explorers Club in New York.108 Bowman – a prominent geographer
who exercised considerable power in academic and exploration circles – immediately warned
Stefansson and Bartlett against controversy. ‘Whatever mistakes either of you has made is a
matter of no concern to the Club for we feel that your achievements far outweigh all other
considerations.  We  propose  to  stand  by  you  and  back  of  you  –  both  of  you’,  Bowman
informed  the  two  men.109 This  warning  was  sufficient  to  prevent  any  open  attack  by
Stefansson on Bartlett. However, Stefansson continued to make indirect attacks. For example,
he convinced Pedersen to issue a public statement that the  Karluk had been fit  for Arctic
work.110 While  preparing his narrative,  The Friendly Arctic,  Stefansson obtained a  written
statement to the same effect from the Canadian naval service.111 With these accounts in hand,
29 October 1914, LAC, RG 42, vol. 470, file 84-2-5 sub 27.
103 For example,  the  Mary Sachs and  Polar Bear crews  were  allowed to trap furs  and keep the profits  for
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he was able to write with confidence in his book about the  Karluk’s suitability.112 Neither
naval officials nor his readers, of course, knew what Stefansson’s real intentions for the ship
had been, and Stefansson may have persuaded Pedersen that Bartlett’s confidences on this
point in 1914 were misleading. 
Hadley died of influenza in January 1919,113 but in 1918 he had provided Stefansson
with a long statement containing many criticisms of Bartlett. When The Friendly Arctic was
published in late 1921, an edited version of this account was included as an appendix.114 As
for the fatal decision to head out to sea from Cross Island in August 1913, Stefansson related
in the main part of the narrative that Hadley,  on whom he relied for local knowledge, had
commented: ‘It may be safe,  but I don’t think so’, while everyone else on board ‘seemed
delighted’ with the decision to follow ‘what they considered the bolder and more sportsman-
like policy.’115 The passage contained no criticism of Bartlett, and indeed the captain was not
even mentioned in it by name. Stefansson later informed a Canadian official that this account
was false in that he himself had been asleep when the decision was taken by Bartlett.  He
attributed  the falsehood to generosity towards Bartlett,  but fear  of  crossing Bowman was
likely the real motive.116 In any case, Stefansson knew that even the censored version of the
Hadley account was enough to cast doubt on Bartlett’s own narrative. As he later explained, ‘I
handled it in such a way that no one will see this as a rebuttal or a part of a dispute except
those who have read Bartlett’s book and know he tells a different story. The Hadley story as
published is not damaging to Bartlett in anything except that it contradicts him.’117 
Bartlett evidently understood this strategy. He denounced Hadley’s version as ‘a lie ...
written to suit Stefansson’, while furiously describing Stefansson himself as ‘a God damn liar
a Poltroon and a sneak.’118 Anderson and the other scientists were eager to have an official
inquiry into the entire expedition.119 At first Bartlett claimed he would join them in asking for
one, but he soon backed out. ‘Don’t be mad with me’, he pleaded to Anderson.120 Bartlett’s
112 Stefansson, Friendly Arctic, p. 47.
113 See LAC, RG 42, vol. 470, file 84-2-5 sub 27.
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decision can be accounted for both by Bowman’s prohibition of controversy and by Bartlett’s
awareness that an inquiry might raise uncomfortable questions about his own conduct. He
never told Anderson about Bowman’s letter to him, pretending instead that he had a subtle,
long-term plan for revenge. But no such plan emerged, nor did Bartlett ever write down a full
version  of  the  story  for  posterity.  Stefansson’s  criticisms  and  the  full  Hadley  account,
meanwhile, remained in the archives, to eventually be used by historian William R. Hunt to
vilify Bartlett.
Historians and the Karluk Disaster
Hunt  described  Bartlett  as  ‘bull-necked,  bull-headed  ...  stubborn  and  self-confident.’ He
considered that Bartlett’s complaints about the ship were unfounded and ‘amounted almost to
malfeasance and damaged the morale of the ship’s company ...  [Bartlett’s  behaviour] also
undermined  Stefansson’s  leadership  –  little  wonder  that  [Stefansson]  lashed  out  in  his
correspondence.  ...  Bartlett  should  have  refused  command  if  he  considered  the  Karluk
unfit.’121 While Hunt repeatedly excused Stefansson’s conduct, he thus judged Bartlett very
harshly. 
A more  judicious,  but  still  generally  pro-Stefansson,  evaluation  was  offered  by
Richard  Diubaldo.  Diubaldo  wrote  that  Bartlett  had  acted  ‘contrary  to  Stefansson’s
instructions  and contrary to  the experience  of whalers  in  the waters  north of Alaska.’ He
rightly pointed out that Stefansson truly believed the ship would likely remain all winter in
Harrison Bay, but argued less convincingly that it was merely ‘Stefansson’s misfortune to be
away’ when a storm came up. Diubaldo further recounted that Stefansson ‘indulged in some
grievous  soul-searching  over  the  Karluk’s  disappearance  and  there  is  strong  evidence  to
suggest that he wished he had never left her.’122 In making this assessment, Diubaldo appears
to have been overly influenced by comments Stefansson made after the  Karluk’s fate was
known, ignoring his earlier determination not to rejoin the ship even if it drifted back within
reach. 
In the most  scrupulously researched and carefully balanced account to date,  Stuart
Jenness gives full weight to Bartlett’s  concerns about grounding, but also seems to accept
Stefansson’s claim that he was intimidated by Bartlett. Jenness writes that after stating his
preference for staying close to shore, Stefansson ‘retired to his cabin’ because he did not want
to ‘argue with the fiery-tempered Newfoundlander.’123 Here Jenness is perhaps too cautiously
neutral, since it is unquestionable that Bartlett would immediately have obeyed a direct order. 
In contrast, Jennifer Niven is wholeheartedly on Bartlett’s side. Basing her account
largely  on  Bartlett’s  1916 narrative  and McKinlay’s  narrative  and papers,  Niven excuses
Bartlett’s failure to resign over the Karluk’s defects with the explanation that his ‘itch’ to go
become involved in an inquiry.
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Press, 1986), pp. 75, 187–8; see also pp. 190–91.
122 Diubaldo, Stefansson and the Canadian Arctic, p. 83.
123 Jenness, Stefansson, Dr. Anderson, pp. 36–7.
22
exploring  again  overrode  other  considerations.  She  asserts  that  the  Karluk went  aground
‘repeatedly’,  when  in  fact  there  was  only  one  grounding.  Niven  rightly  emphasizes  the
contradiction in Stefansson’s urging Bartlett both to make quick progress and to keep the ship
safe, but she suggests that Bartlett was willing to take risks only because he was ‘frustrated’
and ‘tired of running aground.’ Bartlett’s decision at Cross Island was, she writes, ‘a chance
call  based  on  his  desire  to  get  Stefansson  where  he  wanted  to  go.’ As  for  Stefansson’s
departure  from  the  ship,  Niven  does  not  mention  the  extenuating  circumstance  that  he
expected the Karluk to remain in Harrison Bay for the winter.124
Neither the partisan accounts of Hunt and Niven nor the more balanced analyses by
Diubaldo and Jenness consider the possibility that both men may have been deeply at fault.
But  the  evidence  brought  forward  in  this  article  strongly  suggests  that  in  spite  of  their
differences they colluded to take the Karluk on a course for which it was entirely unsuitable
and with which neither their government sponsors nor most of the men under their command
would have agreed. Stefansson’s underhandedness makes him the less attractive figure of the
two, but that  Bartlett  shared in the responsibility for the deaths of eleven men cannot  be
denied. Indeed, if the  Karluk had remained afloat long enough to drift away from Wrangel
Island, the entire ship’s company would almost certainly have perished. Bartlett was far more
concerned about his men than Stefansson (not content with notifying the world about their
plight, he accompanied the rescue ships himself), but he still took them into dangers about
which they had not been informed before they joined the expedition. On the CAE, the lure of
the Arctic continent ruled the captain’s decisions as well as the commander’s. 
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